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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20190424T163000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20190424T173000
DTSTAMP:20240514T180043Z
CREATED:20240212T103852Z
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UID:10001998-1556123400-1556127000@cmsa.fas.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Credible Mechanisms
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Shengwu Li (Harvard)\n\n\nTitle: Credible Mechanisms\n\nAbstract: Consider an extensive-form mechanism\, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single agent detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay\, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.
URL:https://cmsa.fas.harvard.edu/event/4-24-2019-colloquium/
LOCATION:MA
CATEGORIES:Colloquium
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