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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230404T120000
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DTSTAMP:20260521T232557
CREATED:20230817T171014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240228T092930Z
UID:10001240-1680609600-1680613200@cmsa.fas.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design
DESCRIPTION:Member Seminar \nSpeaker: Faidra Monachou \nTitle: Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design \nAbstract: We study dynamic nonmonetary markets where objects are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the quality of the object\, and her payoff is quasilinear in her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a linear combination of allocative efficiency (i.e.\, the sum of values) and welfare (i.e.\, the sum of payoffs). We identify the optimal mechanism in the class of direct-revelation mechanisms that elicit agents’ types and assign them to objects over time. We show that\, when the social planner can design the information disclosed to the agents about the objects\, the optimal mechanism has a simple implementation: a first-come first-served waitlist with deferrals. In this implementation\, the information disclosed about each object is an interval containing the object quality\, rather than the exact quality. These intervals partition the quality space. We also show that when the planner’s objective weight on welfare increases\, these intervals become coarser\, and optimal disclosure policies less informative. A direct corollary is that mechanisms that achieve higher welfare also induce lower distributional inequality\, in terms of the Lorenz order.
URL:https://cmsa.fas.harvard.edu/event/member-seminar-4423/
LOCATION:CMSA Room G10\, CMSA\, 20 Garden Street\, Cambridge\, MA\, 02138\, United States
CATEGORIES:Member Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230411T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230411T130000
DTSTAMP:20260521T232557
CREATED:20230817T171211Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240118T070619Z
UID:10001241-1681214400-1681218000@cmsa.fas.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Spectral gap and two-point functions in spin glasses
DESCRIPTION:Member Seminar \nSpeaker: Changji Xu \nTitle: Spectral gap and two-point functions in spin glasses \nAbstract: Many have worked on spin glass models over the past 50 years\, including physicists\, mathematicians\, and computers. A question that arises is whether computers yield dependable simulation results. In this talk\, I will discuss some recent mathematical progress on spectral gap and two-point functions in spin glasses models.
URL:https://cmsa.fas.harvard.edu/event/member-seminar-41123/
LOCATION:CMSA Room G10\, CMSA\, 20 Garden Street\, Cambridge\, MA\, 02138\, United States
CATEGORIES:Member Seminar
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230418T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230418T130000
DTSTAMP:20260521T232557
CREATED:20230817T171352Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240228T091907Z
UID:10001242-1681819200-1681822800@cmsa.fas.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Recent progress on coupled Einstein-Yang-Mills dynamics
DESCRIPTION:Member Seminar \nSpeaker: Puskar Mondal \nTitle: Recent progress on coupled Einstein-Yang-Mills dynamics \nAbstract: I will discuss my recent work with prof. S.T. Yau on Einstein-Yang-Mills theory. I’ll discuss the main ideas behind the stability of the Minkowski and Milne space time under coupled gauge-gravity perturbations. Construction of the gauge invariant energies that control the suitable norms of the physical degrees of freedom in a double-null framework play an important role. I’ll sketch how the special structure of the Einstein and Yang-Mills nonlinearities play a crucial role in obtaining the stability result of non-expanding spacetimes in particular AF spacetimes.
URL:https://cmsa.fas.harvard.edu/event/member-seminar-41823/
LOCATION:Common Room\, CMSA\, 20 Garden Street\, Cambridge\, MA\, 02138\, United States
CATEGORIES:Member Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230425T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230425T130000
DTSTAMP:20260521T232557
CREATED:20230817T171725Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240118T071815Z
UID:10001243-1682424000-1682427600@cmsa.fas.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:On complete Calabi-Yau metrics and some related Monge-Ampere equations
DESCRIPTION:Member Seminar \nSpeaker: Freid Tong \nTitle: On complete Calabi-Yau metrics and some related Monge-Ampere equations \nAbstract: We will give a basic introduction to constructions for complete Calabi-Yau metrics. A systematic approach to construct such metrics using PDE methods was proposed in the work of Tian-Yau in the 90s and have attracted a lot of attention in recent years. I will discuss some joint work with B. Guo and T. Collins on a singular version of such a construction\, as well as some ongoing work with Prof. Yau on some related boundary value problems. \n 
URL:https://cmsa.fas.harvard.edu/event/member-seminar-42523/
LOCATION:CMSA Room G10\, CMSA\, 20 Garden Street\, Cambridge\, MA\, 02138\, United States
CATEGORIES:Member Seminar
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