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Credible Mechanisms

April 24, 2019 @ 4:30 pm - 5:30 pm

Speaker: Shengwu Li (Harvard)
Title: Credible Mechanisms
Abstract: Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single agent detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.


April 24, 2019
4:30 pm - 5:30 pm
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